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Regulation of Nude Dancing in Bring Your
Own Bottle Establishments in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: Are the
Commonwealth's Municipalities Left to
Fend for Themselves?
I. Introduction
A bring your own bottle establishment (or "bottle club") has been
defined as: "A place where no intoxicating liquors are sold but in which
a member may keep his liquor for consumption on the premises and in
which mixes or so called 'set-ups' are provided by the club."' As these
types of establishments continue to proliferate across the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, they present a myriad of problems for municipalities,
ranging from their hours of operation2 to the types of entertainment
provided.3 When faced with citizen opposition to these businesses,
particularly those that provide nude entertainment, municipalities often
find themselves in a quandry of conflicting constitutional rights, state law
and their own police powers. Thus, attempting to control or eliminate
such activity may prove to be a more difficult proposition than first
imagined.
The purpose of this Comment is to explore the law pertaining to
"bring your own bottle" establishments, particularly those featuring nude
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 185 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Mutchall v. City of Kalamazoo, 35
NW.2d 245 (Mich. 1948)). See also Fantastic Plastic, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 377 A.2d 1051,
1052 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977) (Pittsburgh ordinance defining bring your own bottle establishments
as: "A place of assembly owned, maintained or leased for pecuniary gain in which no intoxicating
liquors are sold, but where patrons are permitted to bring intoxicating liquors upon the premises for
their own use and consumption.").
2. These establishments often become havens for the "after hours" bar crowd when other
state-regulated establishments close. For an example of one community's experience with a bring
your own bottle establishment operating into the "wee hours" of the morning and its response, see
Licensing Is Set for 2 BYOB Clubs, PHILA. INQ., July 1, 1988, at B2.
3. A popular form of entertainment made available to the public is some form of nude
dancing, often under the moniker of "adult entertainment," which is the focus of this Comment.
Nude or partially nude dancing, which historically has been referred to as "striptease dancing" but
is often referred to today as "topless dancing" or "bottomless dancing," has often been the subject
of humorous comment by the courts. For example, a California Superior Court judge in upholding
an anti-topless ordinance stated, "The high court's lesson is to teach that dancing is a form of
speech, and terpsichorean convolution is protected by the constitution, so bestiality's a crime but not
if done in 3-4 time, and jailers will have little chance with felons who know how to dance." Erwin
S. Barbie, Annotation, Topless and Bottomless Dancing or Similar Conduct as Offense, 49
A.L.R.3d. 1084, 1087-88 n.4 (1973).
99 DICKINSON LAw REVIEW FALL 1994
dancing. Special emphasis will be placed on the statutory and case law
of the United States in general, and of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania in particular. Furthermore, it will provide an outline of the
options available to municipalities to effectively control, or possibly
eliminate, these establishments located within their borders.
Section II will provide a background of Pennsylvania's broad
regulatory authority over alcohol in the Commonwealth, along with a
brief overview of the Liquor Control Act. Section III-A will examine the
inability of the Liquor Control Act to effectively regulate these
establishments, the viability of bringing them under state control, and the
consequences of such action to nude dancing. Section III-B will discuss
possible regulation of these establishments at the municipal level, with
special emphasis on various local ordinances. Section III-C will explore
the effectiveness of public indecency ordinances in light of the recent
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc.' Finally, Section III-D will consider the possible application of the
Pennsylvania Obscenity Statute to control this activity, and its relation to
other municipal ordinances in this context.
II. Background
A. Liquor Code Generally
Any discussion of state (or local) government regulations involving
alcohol must begin with an examination of the Twenty-First Amendment
of the United States Constitution.' The United States Supreme Court
has described a state's power over matters involving alcohol as being
"something more than the normal state authority over public health,
welfare and morals."' In fact, the Court has even recognized a state's
4. The issue of nude dancing is of particular interest due to its generally controversial nature,
the inherent First Amendment questions involved and the possible conflict of state and local interests
because of the relation to alcohol in this particular context. See id. at 1088.
5. 501 U.S. 560 (1991)(upholding an Indiana public indecency statute and its application to
ban nude dancing in that state).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, §§ 1. 2 provides:
Section 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United
States is hereby repealed.
Section 2. The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession
of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the
laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.
7. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114 (1972). In LaRue, the Supreme Court upheld
California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control regulations prohibiting sexually explicit live
entertainment or films in licensed bars and nightclubs. Such prohibitions included the performance
of certain specified acts, or simulated acts such as masturbation, sexual intercourse, sexual acts
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ability to absolutely prohibit the manufacture, sale, transportation or
possession of intoxicants if it so chooses.'
Pennsylvania has enacted the "Liquor Code" to regulate alcohol
within the Commonwealth.9 The purpose of the Liquor Code is to
regulate and restrain the sale of liquor, rather than to promote it."°
Section 2-207 of the Liquor Code allows the Commonwealth to control
the manufacture, possession, sale, consumption, importation, use,
storage, transportation, and delivery of liquor, alcohol and malt or
brewed beverages in accord with the provisions of the Liquor Code."
Consequently, Pennsylvania's power has been deemed "virtually
absolute" over the regulation and control of alcohol. 12 In furtherance
of its authority, the Commonwealth may adopt such measures as are
reasonably appropriate to render the effective exercise of its power.,'
In the execution of its legitimate state interest, Pennsylvania,
through the Liquor Control Board, directly controls the beverages that
prohibited by law, touching or fondling of breasts and genitals, displaying of genitals and displaying
films or pictures depicting such prohibited acts. Id. at 111-12. The Court reasoned these
regulations did not, on their face, violate the Federal Constitution, even though some prohibited
were not obscene and within First Amendment protection since (1) the regulations were presented
in the context of licensing bars and nightclubs to sell liquor rather than the context of censoring a
dramatic performance in a theatre; (2) in view of evidence before the state liquor department, its
conclusion that the sale of liquor and lewd or naked dancing should not, simultaneously, take place
in licensed establishments was not irrational; (3) the department's choice of a prophylactic solution
was not unreasonable; and (4) the state regulatory authority was not limited to dealing with the
problem within the limits of Supreme Court decisions as to either obscenity or forms of
communicative conduct. Id. at 115-19.
8. See Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939) (upholding a Kentucky Alcoholic
Beverage Control Law provision requiring a license and payment of a tax before the manufacture,
sale, purchase, transportation or trafficking of alcoholic beverages within the state, and citing
Kentucky's broad powers under the Twenty First Amendment as sufficient authority).
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §101 (Supp. 1993).
10. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd. v. Burrell Food Systems, Inc., 508 A.2d 1308, 1309-10
(Pa. Comrnmw. Ct. 1986) (citing Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd. v. Starr, 318 A.2d 763 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1974), affidper curiam, 337 A.2d 914 (Pa. 1975)), appeal denied, 520 A.2d 1386
(Pa. 1987).
11,. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 2-207(b) (Supp. 1993) (setting forth general powers of the
Liquor Control Board). See also PA. STAT. ANN tit. 47, § 1-104 (Supp. 1993) (providing
interpretation of the Liquor Code).
12. Commonwealth v. Wilsbach Distrib., Inc., 519 A.2d 397,400 (Pa. 1986) (referring to PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 2-207 (Supp. 1993)); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §§ 4-491, 492 (Supp. 1993)
(setting forth unlawful acts under the Liquor Code). But see Dean v. City of Harrisburg, 563 A.2d
965 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) (interpreting Wilsbach as limiting state preemption to liquor
industry/business).
13. Wilsbach, 519 A.2d at 400 (discussing the extent of state regulation over alcohol in the
context of invalidating a City of Harrisburg business privilege tax on a malt and brewed beverage
distributor for reasons of preemption). See also Dean, 563 A.2d at 965 (discussing and interpreting
Wilsbach).
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may be bought and sold in the Commonwealth.' 4  Furthermore, the
Board regulates who may conduct this business on the wholesale and
retail levels, 5 the prices at which beverages may be bought from the
Commonwealth and sold, 6 and the process by which wholesalers and
distributors are issued licenses to sell to consumers. 7 The Board also
controls the geographic location of all licenses, 8 the physical structures
in which beverages may be kept and sold,' 9 and the site of every
licensed premises in the Commonwealth?0 The only concession in the
Liquor Code is the right of municipalities to exclude any or all classes
of licensees (i.e., become "dry municipalities") 2' and to exercise
appropriate zoning controls.2
The Board also maintains broad authority to enforce these
provisions. For example, its officers have full police power and may
check for violations, seize unlawfully obtained beverages in plain view
without a warrant, and make arrests.' The enforcement agents may
also, upon probable cause, search a premises (other than a private home)
without a warrant.' Thereafter, they may seize any illegal liquor,
utensils, boats, or other equipment used in the illegal process or in its
transportation. 5 Additionally, annual fees are imposed for the privilege
of obtaining and maintaining a liquor license issued by the Board.26
These fees, which vary in amount,27 are later rebated to the
14. See title 47, § 2-207.
15. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §§ 4-401 (setting forth authority to issue liquor licenses to
hotels, restaurants and clubs), 4-431 (providing for malt and brewed beverage manufacturer,
distributor and importing distributor licenses), 4-437 (setting forth prohibitions against the grant of
licenses) (Supp. 1993).
16. See title 47, § 2-207(b) (setting forth general powers of board), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47,
§ 2-208(e) (Supp. 1993) (specifying subjects on which board may adopt regulations).
17. See title 47, §§ 2-207(d) (setting forth general powers of board), 4-401 (providing authority
to issue liquor licenses to hotels, restaurants and clubs).
18. See title 47, §§2-207(c) (setting forth general powers of board), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47,
§ 4-461 (Supp. 1993) (limiting the number of retail licenses to be issued in each municipality).
19. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §§ 4-440 (regulating sales by manufacturers of malt or brewed
beverages; minimum quantities), 4-442 (setting retail dispensers' restrictions on purchases and sales),
4-491(6) (specifying unlawful acts relative to liquor, alcohol and liquor licenses) (Supp. 1993).
20. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §§ 4-404 (providing for issuance of hotel, restaurant and club
liquor licenses), 4-437(0 (specifying prohibitions against the grant of licenses) (Supp. 1993).
21. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-472 (Supp. 1993) (providing for local option).
22. Wilsbach, 519 A.2d at 400-401.
23. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §§ 1-104(a) (providing interpretation of act), 2-211 (setting
forth enforcement provisions) (Supp. 1993).
24. Title 47, § 2-211(3) (Supp. 1993) (setting forth enforcement provisions).
25. Id.
26. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 8-801 (Supp. 1993) (requiring money paid into liquor license
fund to be returned to municipalities).
27. For example, the annual fee for hotel and restaurant liquor licenses currently varies (based
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municipality in which the licensee is located.' Finally, the
Commonwealth imposes taxes on all sales of alcohol on the local and
retail levels in addition to imposing four other alcohol taxes. 29
B. The Liquor Code and Bring Your Own Bottle Establishments
Despite this broad range of regulation, Pennsylvania has failed to
enact any effective regulatory scheme involving bring your own bottle
establishments. The Commonwealth has obviously chosen not to control
these businesses via the Liquor Code, although arguably it could do so
since the Liquor Code contemplates the regulation of the possession and
use of alcohol.' State regulation of bring your own bottle
establishments has been upheld in other jurisdictions under similar
statutes .
Pennsylvania's lack of regulation over bring your own bottle
establishments carries some serious ramifications. Bring your own bottle
establishments are allowed to operate virtually free of state control.32
This has led to a multitude of headaches for municipalities as they
grapple with the problem of whether they can legally and effectively
regulate these establishments and the entertainment occurring within their
walls. Even if such regulation is possible, the most effective methods of
on population) from one hundred fifty dollars ($150) to six hundred dollars ($600). PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 47, § 4-405 (Supp. 1993) (setting license fees). The annual license fee for a manufacturer of a
malt or brewed beverage is one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each place of manufacture, while a
distributor's annual license fee is nine hundred dollars ($900) and a retail dispenser's annual fee
varies (based on population) from one hundred dollars ($100) to three hundred dollars ($300). PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-439 (Supp. 1993) (setting malt or brewed beverage license fees).
28. Id.
29. See PA. SrAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 1-103 (Supp. 1993) (incorporating Malt Beverage Tax Law
as previous act under savings clause); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7201(0 (Supp. 1993) (making Sales
Tax Act applicable to liquor); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 7-745 (1969) (creating Spirituous and
Vinous Liquor Tax Law); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 7-795 (1969) (creating Emergency Liquor Tax).
30. See title 47, § 2-207(b). The statute provides, in relevant part: "Under this act, the board
shall have the power and its duty shall be . . . [t]o control the.., possession .... consumption,
[and] . . . use of liquor, alcohol and malt or brewed beverages in accordance with the provisions
of this act .... " Id.
31. See, e.g., State v. Chisholm, 237 A.2d 101 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1967); Grillo v. State, 120
A.2d 384 (Md. 1956); Beacon Club v. Buder, 52 N.W.2d 165 (Mich. 1952), appeal dismissed, 343
U.S. 971 (1952); Arrow Club, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 131 N.W.2d 134 (Neb.
1964); Kent Club v. Toronto, 305 P.2d 870 (Utah 1957). Cf. Segal v. Simpson, 121 So. 2d 790
(Fla. 1969) (holding statute invalid because of arbitrary fee); Derby Club, Inc. v. Becket, 252 P.2d
259 (Wash. 1953) (holding statute invalid because nonexistent permit required).
32. For example, if not restricted by some local regulation, bring your own bottle
establishments can stay open all night or "around the clock," whereas the Liquor Code specifically
regulates the hours of operation of licensed establishments. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §§ 4-406
(placing restrictions on liquor licenses) and 4-492 (specifying unlawful acts relative to malt or
brewed beverages and licensees) (Supp. 1993).
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accomplishing this goal are not always clear. Inherent First and
Fourteenth Amendment issues normally associated with efforts to
regulate a form of expression, such as dancing, only serves to enhance
these problems. Thus, it should come as no surprise that many
municipal officials and solicitors find themselves raising their arms in
despair while asking, "What exactly can be done?!"
III. The Options
There are several options available to regulate bring your own bottle
establishments and the nude dancing performed therein. Each option,
however, may carry certain advantages and disadvantages that militate
against its viability. Each alternative will be discussed below.
A. State Regulation Through Licensing
Perhaps the simplest and most logical solution to controlling nude
dancing activity in bring your own bottle establishments is to bring these
businesses under state control. By requiring the procurement of a liquor
license, the Commonwealth would automatically subordinate these
establishments to the terms and regulations set forth in the Liquor
Code." These laws appear sufficient not only to control nude dancing,
but also to prohibit it outright.
Section 4-493 of the Pennsylvania Liquor Code sets forth unlawful
acts relative to liquor, malt and brewed beverages and licensees under
the Code.' Therein, it specifically regulates the entertainment provided
on licensed premises:
It shall be unlawful ... [flor any licensee, his servants, agents, or
employes, except club licensees, to permit in any licensed premises
or in any place operated in connection therewith, dancing, theatricals
or floor shows of any sort . . . unless the licensee shall first have
obtained from the board a special pehuit to provide such
entertainment, or for any licensee, under any circumstances, to permit
in any licensed premises any lewd, immoral or improper
33. See Commonwealth v. Speer, 42 A.2d 94, 95-96 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1945) (holding
Commonwealth may establish terms upon which liquor licenses may be granted and retained); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 2-208(h) (Supp. 1993) (stating: "[s]ubject to the provisions of this act and'
without limiting the general power conferred by the preceding section, the board may make
regulations regarding . . . [tihe issuance of licenses and permits and the conduct, management,
sanitation, and equipment of places licensed or included in permits.").
34. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §4-493(10) (Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
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entertainment, regardless of whether a permit to provide
entertainment has been obtained or not.Y
Perhaps the best explanation of the "lewd, immoral or improper"
standard was set forth by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in In re Tahiti
Bar. 36 In Tahiti, the court described the test to be applied as "[whether
the conduct in dispute] was a predominant appeal to the prurient
interest," and also relied on the common usage of the terms "lewd,
immoral and improper. "V Applying this analysis the court determined
that the performance of "strip acts" on the licensed premises involving
seductive "bumps and grinds" was a violation of this standard and the
Liquor Code. 38 Thus, the Tahiti case provided the basis for the Liquor
Control Board to effectively enforce this section of the Liquor Code in
similar contexts.39 While the validity of this section has been strongly
challenged, Tahiti has consistently proven to be the definitive word on
the statute and its apparent constitutionality.' °
With regard to First Amendment and other constitutional challenges
to the Liquor Code, Pennsylvania courts have upheld the validity of the
law. Because the liquor business has been deemed "unlawful" and its
conduct is only lawful to the extent permitted by state statute,4 ' a liquor
license becomes a privilege, not a property right.42 In granting and
revoking liquor license "privileges," the Commonwealth may establish
the terms upon which the license may be granted and retained.43 Even
if it is proven that these regulations prohibit or seriously modify one's
35. Id.
36. 150 A.2d 112 (Pa. 1959).
37. Id. at 119.
38. Id. at 115, 119.
39. See e.g., Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd. v. J.P.W.G., Inc., 489 A.2d 992 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1985) (holding determination of lewd. immoral and improper entertainment is a question of law;
partial nude dancing constitutes violation of Code); Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd. v. Ronnie's
Lounge, 383 A.2d 544 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978) (holding sexually explicit gyrations of dancers
amount to violation); Sapia Liquor License Case, 383 A.2d 1283 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978)
(determining that topless dancing amounts to violation); In re: Appeal from Liquor Control Bd.,
21 Pa. D. & C.3d 524 (1981) (holding nude dancing violates Code and subjects licensee to fine).
40. See Tahiti, 150 A.2d at 118, 119 (rejecting argument that terms utilized in statute are too
vague and violate due process requirements, while also rebuffing First and Fourteenth Amendment
challenges); Sapia, 383 A.2d at 1284 (relying on Tahiti to dispel vagueness argument); In re:
Appeal from Liquor Control Bd., 21 Pa. D. & C.3d at 525-526 (relying on Tahiti to dispel First and
Fourteenth Amendment challenges).
41. See Tony Savatt, Inc. v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 583 A.2d 796 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990),
appeal denied, 593 A.2d 843 (1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 586 (1991); Appeals of Sawdey, 82
A.2d 713 (Pa. Super. Ct.), rev'd, 85 A.2d 28 (Pa. 1951).
42. Cavanaugh v. Gelder, 72 A.2d 85 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1950) (relying heavily on Tahiti, 150
A.2d at 112), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 822 (1950).
43. Speer, 42 A.2d at 95-96.
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desired course of conduct, an abridgement of constitutional rights does
not occur." In order to secure the "privilege of a liquor license," an
individual may be required to modify the exercise of certain rights in the
process.' The power of the states to regulate similar activity when
intermingled with alcohol has also withstood constitutional scrutiny from
the United States Supreme Court.'
1. Advantages. -There are many advantages for municipalities
should the Commonwealth take control of bring your own bottle
establishments. First, any "undesirable" entertainment taking place in
these establishments will be effectively curtailed, as application of the
Liquor Code has shown. Second, the cost of implementation and
enforcement will rest upon the Commonwealth, not directly on the
municipalities. Thus, the municipalities would obtain the desired results
without having to pay for them (a cost many municipalities may be
unable to afford). Finally, Liquor Control Board regulations would be
effective in remedying other secondary problems involving these
businesses, such as their proximity to churches, schools, and residential
neighborhoods,' and their irregular operating hours.'
2. Disadvantages. -As attractive as this proposition may appear for
municipalities, it is equally unattractive for the Commonwealth. The
primary reason is that the cost of implementing and enforcing such a law
would place an even greater burden upon the already strained resources
of the Liquor Control Board. The Board has neither the manpower nor
the funds to effectively complete this task, and it appears that any
additional license fees imposed would not be sufficient to offset this
cost.
4 9
44. Tahiti, 150 A.2d at 116.
45. Id. (describing this "exchange").
46. See New York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 717 (1981) (per curiam)
(holding Twenty First Amendment confers power to states to completely ban nude dancing in all
establishments serving liquor); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972), discussed supra note 7.
47. See title 47, §§2-207(c) (setting forth general powers of board), 4-404 (specifying that
board can refuse a new hotel, restaurant or club liquor license or the transfer of an old license to
a new location if such place proposed to be licensed is within three hundred (300) feet of any
church, hospital, charitable institution, school or public playground, or if such new license or
transfer is applied for a place which is within two hundred (200) feet of any other premises which
is already licensed by the board; board may also refuse to grant a license should they determine such
a grant would be detrimental to the welfare, peace and morals of the inhabitants of the neighborhood
within a radius of five hundred (500) feet of the proposed place to be licensed).
48. See Title 47 §4-406 (placing restrictions on days and times licensed establishments may
operate).
49. For example, figures recently released by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania indicate a
total number of only one hundred fifty seven (157) Liquor Enforcement Officers hired for the entire
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Another problem is precisely defining "bring your own bottle
establishments" under the Liquor Code, since an overly broad definition
may encompass some activities which neither the municipalities nor the
Commonwealth have an interest in regulating. For example, a statute
may simply define a bring your own bottle establishment as "a place
where no liquor is sold but where patrons are permitted to bring their
own alcoholic beverages on the premises and, for an admission fee, said
patrons are provided with entertainment." Such a broad definition could
conceivably encompass events such as one or two day political picnics
and fundraisers, or a club opening its doors to show the Super Bowl.
Although both scenarios would fall within the definition of a "bring your
own bottle" establishment, it is doubtful that the regulation and licensing
of such events would serve any valuable purpose, since the predominant
intent of the proposed amendment to the Liquor Code is to curb or
eliminate nude dancing. Enforcement in this context would be nothing
more than a waste of valuable state resources. 5°
State. The office by office breakdown is as follows:
District Enforcement Office Liquor Enforcement Agents











Figures from Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (Oct. 21, 1993) (on file with
the Dickinson Law Review and the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board).
Furthermore, the Liquor Control Board currently reports 1993-94 operating budget of
$193,662,000, with $14,098,000 already allocated for enforcement. Id. Hence, any increase in
enforcement capability does not appear to be feasible without increased funding from the State.
Whether the State is willing to appropriate additional funds for the purpose of policing bring your
own bottle establishments for nude dancing and other violations remains to be seen.
50. Consider a more narrowly drawn definition such as this:
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Furthermore, should the Pennsylvania Legislature equate "bring
your own bottle licenses" with other types of liquor licenses, the current
state of the Liquor Code would render the procurement of such a license
almost impossible. This anomaly comes about as a result of the Liquor
Code's "quota system," which places limits on the total number of
licenses issued within a community based on its population."t
Consequently, existing quota limitations would provide a simple and
effective solution to the nude dancing problem by eliminating many of
the businesses entirely.5 2 However, this may not be a "profitable"
decision for the Commonwealth or municipality and may deprive these
governmental entities of valuable tax dollars generated by these
businesses. These consequences would exceed the true purpose and
scope of the amendment, which is primarily to eliminate the nude
dancing activity within these establishments. 3
3. Recommendation. -The lack of legislative action in this area
suggests that the disadvantages and difficulties of Liquor Control Board
licensing are apparent to the Pennsylvania Legislature. In light of these
considerations, the prospect of bringing these establishments under state
A 'bring your own bottle establishment,' for the purposes of this Section, includes any
for-profit place of business providing entertainment in return for a cover charge or other
admission fee and permitting patrons to bring their own liquor and malt and brewed
beverages in any container or in any mixture onto the premises.
(1) For purposes of this Section, 'any for-profit place of business' does not include:
a) premises utilized for special one-day events not to occur more than (x) times within
any (y) month period, such a$, but not limited to, those conducted by any hospital,
church, synagogue, volunteer fire company, volunteer ambulance company, volunteer
rescue squad, any auxiliary of the foregoing, or any political candidate or political
subdivision; b) premises already duly licensed under this act to sell liquor and malt and
brewed beverages.
51. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-461 (Supp. 1993) (limiting the number of retail liquor
licenses to be issued in each municipality to one for every three thousand (3,000) inhabitants).
52. For example, the total number of retail licenses for the sale of liquor and malt beverages
in effect (as of December 31, 1992) was 17,619 - with restaurants constituting the majority of
license holders at 11,580. Figures released by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Liquor Control
Board (Oct. 21, 1993) (on file with the Dickinson Law Review and the Pennsylvania Liquor Control
Board). The key statistic, however, is the proportion of licenses to the current population
requirement of three thousand (3,000). This ratio currently stands at four and one-half (4.5) licenses
per every three thousand (3,000) population - far in excess of the statutory requirement of one
license to every three thousand (3,000) inhabitants. Id. Hence, even discounting the added burden
of potential "bring your own bottle license" applications, these facts evidence the near impossibility
of procuring a liquor license today, absent the purchase of an existing license from another holder.
53. Thus, the Pennsylvania Legislature would have to make an exception in the Liquor Code,
classifying these "bring your own bottle licenses" as separate and distinct from the other genre of
licenses and exempt them from existing quota restrictions. It would be proper, however, to include
a separate quota requirement for the "bring your own bottle licenses" in order to control the number
of such establishments throughout the Commonwealth and each municipality.
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control appears remote. Thus, municipalities must be prepared to tackle
the nude dancing problem themselves.
B. Individual Municipal Action
With no assistance from the State apparently forthcoming, another
alternative is for municipalities to take affirmative action and regulate
these establishments and the nude dancing on their own. However, in
doing so, municipalities must be wary of two potential roadblocks: the
inherent limitation of their police power and the possibility of state
preemption in the field of alcohol regulation.
1. Limits of Police Power. -An initial municipal reaction might be
rather simplistic in nature - use the government police power to prevent
the establishments from opening in the first place. However, an
important question remains - just how far does the municipal police
power extend in such circumstances?
The most definitive authority on the limits of this power is the case
of Fantastic Plastic, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh.' In Fantastic Plastic,
the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court set the parameters of municipal
authority by prohibiting any law that is "unreasonable, unduly oppressive
or patently beyond the necessities of the case."" The court further
required that the means employed have a "substantial relation" to the
municipal goal - that being the public good.' Applying this standard
to the facts of the case, the court found that the prohibitory nature of
Pittsburgh's city ordinance (which banned all bottle clubs within the city
limits)57 was "unreasonable" and "clearly beyond the necessities of the
54. 377 A.2d 1051 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977).
55. Id. at 1053-54 (citing Gambone v. Commonwealth, 101 A.2d 634, 637 (Pa. 1954)).
56. Id.
57. The Pittsburgh ordinance, in relevant part, stated:
WHEREAS, it is the public policy of the City of Pittsburgh to maintain the peace,
to restrain disturbances and disorderly assemblies, and to secure the general safety and
welfare of its inhabitants; and
WHEREAS, the operation of bottle clubs constitutes a menace to the peace, general
safety and welfare of the City's inhabitants; NOW THEREFORE,
THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF PITTSBURGH HEREBY ENACTS AS
FOLLOWS:
Section 1. Definitions:
"Person" shall include the singular and the plural and shall mean any person, firm,
partnership, association, corporation, company or organization of any kind.
"Bottle Club" shall mean a place of assembly owned, maintained or leased, for
pecuniary gain, in which no intoxicating liquors are sold, but where patrons are permitted
to bring intoxicating liquors upon the premises for their own use and consumption.
Section 2. It shall be unlawful for any person to operate, or cause to be operated,
a bottle club ....
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case. "' The court further recognized that the current state regulation
of liquor was "adequate" in serving public policy.59
In addition to the reasons cited by the Fantastic Plastic court,
similar prohibitions on the lawful use of property have been consistently
struck down as oppressive.' Hence, it appears that the municipal
police power is limited to regulating bring your own bottle
establishments rather than prohibiting such businesses outright.6
Attempting to eliminate nude dancing with a blanket provision banning
the clubs entirely is, therefore, not a viable option.
2. State Preemption.-In Fantastic Plastic, the court failed to
express any opinion as to whether the Liquor Code preempted municipal
regulation of these establishments.62 However, the same court recently
clarified this issue in Dean v. City of Harrisburg.63 In Dean, the city
of Harrisburg attempted to regulate bring your own bottle clubs by
incorporating time and location restrictions into its city ordinance.'
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court invalidated the ordinance on
procedural grounds.' It further concluded that "the Liquor Code
preemption is confined to the regulation of the alcoholic beverage
industry" and the manufacture, sale and distribution of these
beverages.' Thus, since bring your own bottle establishments are not
part of the alcoholic beverage industry, local regulation by ordinance is
appropriate. 67
Id. at 1052.
58. Id. at 1054.
59. Fantastic Plastic, 377 A.2d at 1054.
60. See Lutz v. Armour, 151 A.2d 108 (Pa. 1959) (cited with approval in Fantastic Plastic,
377 A.2d at 1054). See also Norate Corporation, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 207 A.2d
890 (Pa. 1965); Amerada Hess Corporation v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 313 A.2d 787 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1973) (applying same rationale to zoning cases).
61. Fantastic Plastic, 377 A.2d at 1054 n.6.
62. Id. at 1053 n.5.
63. 563 A.2d 965, 966 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989).
64. The Harrisburg ordinance, in relevant part, stated:
Section 3. It shall be unlawful for any person or persons who own, operate, lease,
manage or control a B.Y.O.B Club to:
(a) Remain open and/or transact business between the hours of 2:00 a.m. and
8:00 a.m., prevailing time, of each day and at any time on Sundays, if said B.Y.O.B.
Club is located within 500 feet of a residence or church.
Id. at 966.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 968 (interpreting and distinguishing Wilsbach and Fantastic Plastic as limiting State
preemption to alcohol industry),
67. Id. Furthermore, any type of "licensing" ordinance pertaining to said establishments
appears to be valid, as similar ordinances have been upheld by the United States Supreme Court and
other courts. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (validating ordinance
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3. Advantages.-While not completely eliminating the nude dancing
occurring within these establishments, local regulation can effectively
curb some of the secondary problems associated with this activity. For
example, by controlling the geographic location of the clubs,
municipalities can separate them from residential communities.68 This
would minimize conflict with neighborhood citizens and limit the
exposure of children to such sites.' Furthermore, restricting hours of
operation can effectively reduce neighborhood conflicts, nuisance
complaints and criminal activity.7' In fact, municipal restriction may
become so pervasive that the municipalities could, in essence, regulate
these establishments out of business. Consequently, municipalities may
be able to meet their goal of abolishing the nude dancing activity through
the use of municipal ordinances.7'
4. Disadvantages.-While apparently operating within the
boundaries of the law in regulating these establishments, municipalities
must still be careful. Controlling the geographic location of these
businesses may constitute municipal regulation of land use and zoning,'
necessitating the application of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning
Code73 and its procedural provisions relating to zoning ordinances.74
The court in Dean found this to be the case after examining the preamble
and provisions of the Harrisburg ordinance." The court then
invalidated the ordinance because the city failed to adhere to the
requiring all sexually oriented businesses to procure a license). See also, Lee R. Russ, Annotation,
Validity of Statutes or Ordinances Requiring Sexually Oriented Businesses to Obtain Operating
Licenses, 8 A.L.R.4th 130 (1981).
68. See supra note 2.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. However, this begs the question of whether such regulation engenders an "unconstitutional
taking."
72. See Borough of Edgeworth v. MacLeod, 456 A.2d 682 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983) (holding
regulation of land use and development amounts to zoning regardless of delineation of specific
zoning districts). See also Board of Supervisors of Franklin Township v. Meals, 426 A.2d 1200
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981) (determining that building permit ordinance regulating building setbacks
amounts to zoning ordinance and requires adherence to Municipalities Planning Code requirements).
73. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10101 (Supp. 1993).
74. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10608-10 (Supp. 1993) (setting forth procedural provisions
involving the enactment of zoning ordinances, zoning ordinance amendments, landowner curative
amendments and municipal curative amendments, as well as publication of advertisement and
availability requirements for zoning ordinances).
75. The preamble proved to be the fatal flaw in Dean, as the court relied heavily on this section
of the Harrisburg ordinance: "Section 1. The Council of the City of Harrisburg hereby declares
the purpose of within Ordinance is to regulate the hours of operation of a B. Y O.B Club in order
to preserve the residential character of neighborhoods and protect the right of its citizens to the quiet
enjoyment of the same." Dean, 563 A.2d at 969 (emphasis added).
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procedural requirements of the Planning Code.76 However, the court,
in dicta, suggested that the ordinance would have been valid if it was
solely intended to provide protection from criminal activities.' Thus,
municipalities must be aware of such requirements when adopting similar
ordinances.
5. Recommendation.-Although falling short of total abolition,
zoning and other ordinances appear to be highly effective methods of
controlling some of the problems presented by nude dancing and bring
your own bottle establishments. While municipalities must beware of the
procedural requirements emphasized in Dean, such requirements are
easily met by proper drafting and strict adherence to the Municipalities
Planning Code. However, even with such regulation, the significant
problem of nude dancing may continue to pervade the community.
Should municipalities be willing to acquiesce to this activity and be
content in regulating such facets as time and place, the local ordinance
option is strongly suggested.
C. Public Indecency Ordinance
The effectiveness of regulating the conduct of nude dancers was
brought to the forefront in the recent United States Supreme Court case
of Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.." In Barnes, the Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of an Indiana public indecency statute, as
applied to nude dancing establishments located throughout the state.79
The resulting controversial decision has evoked much commentary and
criticism among legal scholars, students and practitioners alike. 80
1. The Decision.-In a five to four (5-4) decision, the Court upheld
the statute, which ostensibly banned nudity in all public places.8' In
76. Id. (relying on and citing MacLeod, 456 A.2d at 682 and Meals, 426 A.2d at 1200).
77. Id.
78. 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (plurality opinion).
79. Id.
80. For commentary and criticism of the Court's decision, see Zachary T. Fardon, Recent
Development, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.: Nude Dancing and the First Amendment Question, 45
VAND. L. REV. 237 (1992); Gianni Servodidio, Comment, The Devaluation of Non-Obscene
Eroticism as a Form of Expression Protected by the First Amendment, 67 TUL. L. REv. 1231 (1993);
Timothy T. Tesluk, Comment, Barnes v. Glen Theatre: Censorship? So What?, 42 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 1103 (1992); Thomas Osran, How Much Freedom is Too Much, 13 HUM. RTS. Q. 26
(1991).
81. "The Indiana Code § 35-45-4-1 (1988) reads as follows:
Public Indecency
Sect. 1. (a) A person who knowingly or intentionally, in a public place:
(1) engages in sexual intercourse;
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writing the plurality opinion, Chief Justice William Rhenquist noted that
"nude dancing of the kind sought to be performed here is expressive
conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though we
view it as only marginally so."12 He determined that the statute's
prohibition of nude dancing was clearly within the state's constitutional
power, and further noted the substantial government interest in
promoting morality and protecting societal order.83 The Chief Justice
concluded that application of the statute in this particular context was not
related to the suppression of free expression.8 It merely constituted an
incidental infringement upon the protected activity in question.'
In a concurring opinion, Justice Souter concluded that the statute's
prohibition of nude dancing withstood constitutional scrutiny.' He
chose to emphasize the state's interest in controlling secondary effects of
this adult entertainment, which include prostitution, sexual assault and
other criminal activity.' Like Rhenquist, he found such action was
incidentally related to a restraint of expression.' Justice Scalia, in
another concurrence, also pronounced his belief that the statute was
constitutional because it merely regulated conduct that was not in any
way directed at expression.89 This collective reasoning has given
(2) engages in deviate sexual conduct;
(3) appears in a state of nudity; or
(4) fondles the genitals of himself or another person; commits public indecency,
a class A misdemeanor.
(b) "Nudity" means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area,
or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple, or the
showing of the covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state."
Barnes, 501 U.S. at 569 n.2.
82. Id, at 566 (opinion joined by O'Connor and Kennedy, JJ.).
83. Id. at 565-72.
84. Id. at 570-72.
85. Id. Chief Justice Rhenquist stated:
[Tihe requirement that the dancers don pasties and a G-string does not deprive the
dance of whatever erotic message it conveys; it simply makes the message slightly less
graphic. The perceived evil that Indiana seeks to address is not erotic dancing, but public
nudity .... [I]t was not the dancing that was prohibited, but simply its being done in
the nude.
Barnes, 501 U.S. at 571.
86. Id. at 581-83 (Souter, J., concurring).
87. Id. (noting secondary effects such as prostitution, sexual assault and other criminal
activity).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2463 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia said: "In my view, however, the
challenged regulation must be upheld ...because, as a general law regulating conduct and not
specifically directed at expression, it is not subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all." Barnes, 501
U.S. at 572.
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municipalities a free reign to regulate what was once thought to be an
almost "untouchable" and highly protected constitutional right.'
2. The Problem of Facial Overbreadth and Indiana's Saving
Interpretation. -While the Indiana public indecency statute may appear
to be too broad and entail suppression of other constitutionally protected
expression, such as nudity occurring within a play or ballet, this has not
been held to be the case. A key factor in the Barnes decision was an
earlier ruling by the Indiana Supreme Court upholding the same public
indecency statute against a similar vagueness and overbreadth
challenge. 9 The Indiana court gave the statute a limited construction
and interpreted it as a prohibition on nude entertainment in theaters,
nightclubs and other public establishments. 92 However, it refused to
recognize the statute as a total ban on nudity on all occasions in all
public places. 93  This determination was supported by the State's
selective enforcement of the law, as it had never been used in prohibiting
nudity as part of a play or ballet.' Hence, the statute avoided the fatal
flaw which caused the demise of other, similar ordinances.' The
United States Supreme Court was able to effectively bypass this issue and
render its decision validating the statute.'
3. Advantages.-The advantages of enacting a similar public
indecency ordinance are apparent. Once a dancer appears nude on stage,
a violation of the ordinance occurs.' Each separate performance,
90. In Barnes, the Supreme Court seemed to backtrack on its previous line of decisions
regarding the regulation of nude dancing. See Schad v. Borough of Mt. Emphraim, 452 U.S. 61
(1981) (striking down ordinance banning all live nude entertainment for reasons of overbreadth);
Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975) (suggesting nude dancing might be entitled to First
Amendment protection in some circumstances, while invalidating ordinance banning topless
performances in all public areas for reasons of overbreadth).
91. See State v. Baysinger, 397 N.E.2d 580 (Ind. 1979).
92. Id. at 582-83, 587.
93. Id.
94. "No arrests have ever been made for nudity as part of a play or ballet." Barnes, 501 U.S.
at 590 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting the affidavit of Sgt. Timothy Corbett).
95. See Schad, 452 U.S. at 61 and Doran, 422 U.S. at 922.
96. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 565 n.l.
97. An example of an effective local ordinance adopted in Pennsylvania is the public indecency
ordinance of West Mahanoy Township, located in Schuylkill County. The West Mahanoy ordinance
adopts the public indecency criteria of the Indiana statute verbatim and adds the following sections:
Section 3: Any person who knowingly or intentionally in a public place, commits
any of the acts listed in Section 1 hereof shall, upon conviction thereof, be sentenced to
pay a fine of not more than six Hundred Dollars ($600.00) and costs of prosecution, and
in default of payment of such fines and costs, to imprisonment in the county jail not to
exceed thirty (30) days. Each day during any violation of this ordinance continues shall
constitute a separate offense.
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either on the same day or on different days, would constitute another
separate offense. As one could imagine, the fines would quickly begin
to mount.98 This, in turn, would provide an effective deterrent for
those dancers desiring to return to any particular establishment to "bare
all" for the patrons. It may also serve to deter those prospective dancers
recruited by the establishment owners to replace any lost "talent." With
few or no dancers willing to risk being cited and fined for each
performance, the establishments would soon find themselves with two
options: either provide alternative, non-nude entertainment" or close
down. Furthermore, the allure of these businesses may wane once the
nude dancing no longer takes place. Patrons may also avoid the clubs
for fear of being present during a police raid. The effect could result in
a substantial loss of profits and further precipitate the close of these
establishments. Thus, in either scenario, the municipalities could
effectively eliminate the nude dancing problem.
4. Disadvantages.-The major disadvantage of a public indecency
ordinance is that it does not directly operate on the owners of the
establishments. It applies solely to the perpetrators of the illegal
conduct - the nude dancers. Thus, unless the proprietors have agreed
to pay any fines incurred by the dancers, they may continue to operate
the establishments without immediate personal consequences, so long as
the supply of dancers and finances remains adequate. Additionally, the
five to four decision of Barnes places such ordinances in a tenuous
position especially since they may be subject to future upheaval as the
composition of the Supreme Court changes."0
Section 4: The provisions of this Ordinance shall be severable, and if any sentence,
clause, section or part thereof is for any reason found to be unconstitutional, illegal or
invalid, such unconstitutionality, illegality or invalidity shall not affect or impair any of
the remaining provisions, sentences, clauses, sections or parts of this Ordinance. It is
hereby declared as the intent of the Board of Supervisors of West Mahanoy Township
that this Ordinance would have been adopted had such unconstitutional, illegal or invalid
sentence, clause, section or part thereof not been included herein.
West Mahanoy Township, Schuylkill County, Pa., Ordinance 1-93 (June 4, 1993).
98. Fines are generally imposed for violating these ordinances, and may vary in amount. See,
e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 48308 (Supp. 1993) (providing for fines up to one thousand dollars
($1,000) for violating a borough building, fire and public safety ordinance, and fines up to six
hundred dollars ($600) for violating any other ordinance).
99. Providing pasties and G-strings to the dancers as referred to in Barnes, would clearly
suffice to cover the male and female genitals and breasts, thus avoiding a violation of the ordinance.
Barnes, 111 501 U.S. at 565, 572.
100. Yet another disadvantage arises when municipalities attempt to concurrently enforce these
public indecency ordinances with State enforcement of the Obscenity Statute. For more thorough
discussion on this matter, see infra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
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5. Recommendation. -Regardless of the tenuous state of the law,
the public indecency ordinance appears to be a highly reliable and
effective tool available to municipalities. While the ordinance does not
directly operate on the establishment owners, the secondary effects may
have a substantial impact on the operation of the businesses. These
effects would either force the establishments to make their dancers
comply with the ordinance or, in the alternative, force the club to close
down. While some municipalities may be willing to continue to operate
these establishments, this must be considered a necessary and beneficial
trade off in order to facilitate the elimination of the nude dancing
problem. 01
D. Alternative State and Local Action Under Pennsylvania Obscenity
Statute and Local Obscenity Ordinances
There is a final option, which may present a way to effectively
prosecute both the nude dancers and the owners of the establishments -
the Pennsylvania Obscenity Statute."°2 In enforcing such a law, there
is no First Amendment controversy, since obscenity is not a protected
facet of speech. 3  The courts have stated: "Obscenity finds itself
without the protection of the First Amendment because by definition, it
lacks communicative value."" °  However, in order to protect those
forms of speech that are not obscene, states must establish precise
objective standards by which a work may be judged."°' Furthermore,
whenever they attempt to prevent the commercial dissemination of
allegedly obscene material, states must also provide certain procedural
safeguards. '6 Pennsylvania has accomplished this through its
Obscenity Statute, which has withstood constitutional scrutiny"° and,
101. As stated earlier, an outright prohibition of these establishments would be invalidated since
they have been recognized as valid, lawful business uses. See Fantastic Plastic v. City of Pittsburgh,
377 A.2d 1051 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977).
102. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903 (Supp. 1993) (relating to obscene and other sexual
materials and performances).
103. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Duggan v. 807 Liberty Avenue, Inc. 288
A.2d 750, 753 (Pa. 1972) (citing United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971) and Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)).
104. Duggan, 288 A.2d at 753 n.8 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942)).
105. Id. at 754.
106. Id. (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965)). In fact, the United States Supreme
Court had earlier stated: "Our insistence that regulations of obscenity scrupulously embody the most
rigorous procedural safeguards.. . is therefore, but a special insistence of the larger principle that
the freedoms of expression must be ringed about with adequate bulwarks." Bantam Books v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
107. See Commonwealth v. McCool, 563 A.2d 901 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (holding that section
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hence, provides an interesting alternative method of dealing with the
nude dancing problem.
1. The Anti-Obscenity Act as Applied.-Section 5903 of the
Obscenity Statute provides, in relevant part:
(a) Offenses defined.-No person, knowing the obscene
character of the materials or performances involved, shall:...
(5) produce, present or direct any obscene performance or
participate in a portion thereof that is obscene or that contributes to
its obscenity;
(b) Definitions.-As used in this section the following
words and phrases shall have the meanings given to them
in this subsection:
"Knowing. " As used in subsection (a), knowing means having
general knowledge of, or reason to know or a belief which warrants
further inspection or inquiry of, the character and content of any
material or performance described therein which is reasonably
susceptible of examination by the defendant.
"Obscene." Any material or performance, if:
(1) the average person applying contemporary community
standards would find that the subject matter taken as a whole appeals
to the prurient interest;
(2) the subject matter depicts or describes in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct of a type described in this section; and
(3) the subject matter, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, educational or scientific value.
"Performance. " Means any play, dance or other live exhibition
performed before an audience.
was not unconstitutionally vague due to the absence of a reference to the "reasonable man" standard
in determining whether the subject matter lacked serious literary, artistic, political, educational or
scientific value); Commonwealth v. Bond, 504 A.2d 869 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (determining that
terms "obscene material" and "prurient interest" in obscenity statute are neither unconstitutionally
vague nor overbroad because they are self-defined and may relate to a prurient interest in something
other than sex); Commonwealth v. Hulehan, 487 A.2d 980 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (ruling that since
section mirrored prevailing standard for obscenity as established by the United States Supreme
Court, Pennsylvania Superior Court did not have authority to find that standard nonetheless violative
of the Federal Constitution, as the Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter of the Federal Constitution).
Cf. Commonwealth v. Burak, 335 A.2d 820 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975) (finding previous act
unconstitutional for not properly defining sexual conduct being prohibited).
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"Sexual conduct." Patently offensive representations or
descriptions of ultimate sexual acts... including sexual intercourse,
anal or oral sodomy and sexual bestiality; and patently offensive
representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions,
sadomasochistic abuse and lewd exhibition of the genitals."'a
In applying the statute to nude dancing, it is apparent that although
this dancing would intuitively seem to be clearly "obscene," the statutory
components must still be satisfied. The fact that the performance was
done in the nude is not dispositive, since nudity, in and of itself, does
not constitute obscenity. " Thus, it appears that the particular
performance must be shown to have consisted of some erotic sexual
behavior or contained similar connotations in accordance with the
definition of "sexual conduct." The conduct must then be shown to
offend contemporary community standards,"° appeal to the prurient
interest, and have no redeeming societal value. Finally, to obtain a
conviction under the statute, the establishment owners and dancers must
be shown to have known the obscene nature of the performances.
Proving these factors should not be an overly difficult task. Much
of the nude dancing may be performed as part of "striptease" acts
involving highly erotic dances and actions such as feigned intercourse or
masturbation. In this situation, the performance would clearly fit within
the statutory meaning of obscenity as a patently offensive representation
of sexual conduct and an appeal to the prurient interest."'
Furthermore, a strong argument may be made for the lack of any
redeeming social, artistic or educational value in these performances.
When viewed in this context, their predominant purpose constitutes
nothing more than a commercial exploitation of the sexual appetites of
the establishment's patrons, rather than a simple form of self-expression
or work of art. "12
108. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903 (a)(5), (b) (Supp. 1993). The statute also provides
exemptions for certain museums and libraries. See 18 PA. CONST. STAT ANN. § 5903() (Supp.
1993).
109. Commonwealth v. Baer, 227 A.2d 915 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967) (citing Manual Enterprises,
Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962)).
In Baer, the court held that a book describing an adulterous affair between a young man and his
employer's wife and two magazines which consisted largely of photographs of nude and semi-nude
young women, but contained no offensive sexual material, were not "obscene" - although possibly
vulgar and tawdry. Id.
110. Contemporary community standards means contemporary state standards for purposes of
the act. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903 (b) (Supp. 1993) (defining "community").
111. Id. (defining "obscenity").
112. Compare the sexual discussion as part of Henry Miller's book The Tropic of Cancer, which
was found not obscene in Commonwealth v. Robin, 218 A.2d 546 (Pa. 1966).
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Additionally, in attempting to prove that this conduct violates
contemporary community standards and appeals to the prurient interest,
no expert testimony is required." 3 The performances themselves can
serve as evidence, allowing the finders of fact to make their own
determination on this issue."' Finally, the additional element of
scienter is also easily met. In all likelihood, the owners of the
establishments will be aware of the content and purpose of the acts. In
fact, the proprietors may even have hired the dancers on the basis of the
quality of these performances." 5 It is also evident that the dancers will
know and appreciate the quality, nature and theme of their routines on
most occasions. Hence, based on these facts, it is evident that many, if
not all, of the nude dancing performances are done in probable violation
of the act and may be proven so before the court." 6
However, even this result was reached with some opposition and Justice Michael Musmanno's
strong dissent provided a few choice words for both the author and his work:
'Cancer' is not a book. It is a cesspool, an open sewer, a pit of putrefaction, a
slimy gathering of all that is rotten in the debris of human depravity. And in the center
of all this waste and stench, besmearing himself of its foulest defilement, splashes, leaps,
cavorts and wallows a bifurcated specimen that responds to the name of Henry Miller.
One wonders how the human species could have produced so lecherous, blasphemous,
disgusting and amoral a human being as Henry Miller. One wonders why he is received
in polite society . . . . From Pittsburgh to Philadelphia, from Dan to Beersheba, and
from the ramparts of the Bible to Samuel Eliot Morison's Oxford History of the
American People, I dissent.
Id. at 561 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
113. See United States v. Gundlach, 345 F. Supp. 709 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Hulehan, 487 A.2d
at 980; Commonwealth v. Croll, 480 A.2d 266 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
114. See Gundlach, 345 F. Supp. at 709; Hulehan, 487 A.2d at 980; Croll, 480 A.2d at 266.
115. However, this application raises an interesting question on whether the statute would apply
to a "hands-off" proprietor who owns the establishment but leaves the day to day operations to a
general manager. Research has revealed no Pennsylvania case law on point, but in some cases it
appears evident that the element of scienter may be lacking regarding the "absent owner."
Conversely, in this situation the statute appears to be enforceable against the general manager as a
"producer" or "presenter." However, neither is there any definitive Pennsylvania case law on this
point, nor does the statute define the terms "presenter" or "producer." See 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5903.
116. While the State Obscenity Statute may apply to this scenario, any attempted prosecution
under the Pennsylvania Open Lewdness Statute would not be recommended. See 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5901 (1983). The Open Lewdness Statute provides: "A person commits a
misdemeanor of the third degree if the does any lewd act which he knows is likely to be observed
by others who would be affronted or alarmed." Id. However, this statute would be totally
inapplicable to nude dancing in a nightclub-type setting. These areas are not accessible to the
general, unsuspecting public, and the patrons viewing the performances could not be described as
being "affronted" or "alarmed" when it is clear they view the performance as entertainment by the
payment of an entrance fee. See Commonwealth v. AlIsup, 392 A.2d 1309 (Pa. 1978). Cy.
Commonwealth v. Davidson, 289 A.2d 250 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1972) (holding nude motorist asking
pedestrian for directions constitutes open lewdness); Commonwealth v. Polomchak, 10 Pa. D. &
C.4th 395 (1991) (determining patron at bar feigning masturbation under jacket and directing
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2. Advantages.-There are numerous advantages in obtaining a
conviction under the Obscenity Statute. Perhaps the principal advantage
is the application of the law to both the owners of the establishments, as
"producers" and "presenters" of the obscene exhibitions," 7 and the
nude dancers as the "performers" of the prohibited activity." 8 In
pursuing such an action, the prosecution has the choice of remedy and
may seek either an injunction of the activity," 9 criminal sanctions
against the perpetrators, or both.12'
The injunction appears to be particularly effective, as the
prosecution may attempt to enjoin the nude dancing before the
performances even take place,' 2' and would, upon a finding of
obscenity beyond a reasonable doubt,"2 prohibit erotic nude dancing
from occurring in the future. The injunction is limited, however, to
prohibiting conduct which had been judged "obscene,"" 2 and certain
rigid procedural guidelines must be followed. " Thus, the
establishments may continue to operate and the dancers may continue to
perform, so long as the erotic behavior is "modified."
The statute may also have the effect of closing down these
businesses completely. Should the statute be rigidly enforced, the
establishment owners may face a decline in business popularity and
profitability as a result of the "toned down" performances. In the
conduct toward another customer constitutes open lewdness).
117. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903 (a)(5).
118. Id.
119. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903(g).
120. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903(h) (providing that persons violating the obscene
performance provision are guilty of a first degree misdemeanor, with repeat offenders guilty of a
third degree felony).
121. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903(g) (permitting attorney for Commonwealth to
institute proceedings in equity against persons who violate or may violate section for purposes of
enjoining such violation).
122. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903(g) (requiring prosecutor to prove all elements beyond
a reasonable doubt).
123. See Long v. 130 Market Street Gift and Novelty, Etc., 440 A.2d 517 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1982).
In affirming the lower court's determination of obscenity regarding certain films and books,
the Superior Court stated:
We do note, however, that it is universally recognized that the power of a state to
suppress obscenity is limited by the constitutional protection accorded free expression and
there is thus no power to restrict the dissemination of publications or films which are not
obscene . . . . We do not hesitate to strike out those portions of the injunction which
purport to enjoin unadjudicated materials.
Id. at 523 (citing Brightbill v. Rigo, Inc., 418 A.2d 424, 427 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
124. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903(g) (Supp. 1993) (requiring hearing within three (3)
days of the demand of the prosecutor, with final decree to be filed with prothonotary within twenty
four (24) hours of the close of the hearing).
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alternative, the owners may face stiff penalties should they defy the
statute and revert to the previous practice of presenting the erotic or
obscene nude dancing. Hence, the Pennsylvania Obscenity Statute, as
applied, would greatly serve municipal interests in either the elimination
of nude dancing or the establishments, in general.
3. Disadvantages.-While such convictions may be probable and
effective in curbing the nude dancing problem, the process of bringing
such a prosecution lies predominantly with the county district attorneys,
not the municipalities." In this regard, the district attorneys have
"broad" prosecutorial discretion:
In the performance of his duties the district attorney is a quasi-
judicial officer with the duty to seek justice, not just
convictions .... In considering the extent of the district attorney's
power, it is important to bear in mind that the district attorney's
function is to represent the Commonwealth in criminal
prosecutions .. . . A district attorney has a general and widely
recognized power to conduct criminal litigation and prosecutions on
behalf of the Commonwealth, and to decide whether and when to
prosecute, and whether and when to continue or discontinue a
case. 1
26
Hence, those municipalities finding themselves faced with "disinterested"
prosecutors must be prepared to take alternative action."=
4. Alternatives to the Anti-Obscenity Act Option.-When
municipalities face such a dilemma, all is not lost. There are a number
125. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1402(a) (Supp. 1993) states, in relevant part: "The district
attorney shall sign all bills of indictment and conduct in court all criminal and other prosecutions in
the name of the Commonwealth, or when the Commonwealth is a party, which arise in the county
for which he is elected . . . . " See also Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Bauer, 261 A.2d 573
(Pa. 1970) (holding that the district attorney has the power and duty to represent the
Commonwealth's interest in the enforcement of its criminal laws).
126. Commonwealth v. Malloy, 450 A.2d 689, 691-92 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (citing
Commonwealth v. Pfaff, 384 A.2d 1179 (Pa. 1978) and In re Petition of Piscanio, 344 A.2d 658
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1975)) (emphasis supplied).
The court further concluded: "Thus, the district attorney is permitted to exercise sound discretion
to refrain from proceeding in a criminal case whenever, he, in good faith, thinks that the prosecution
would not serve the best interests of the State." Id. at 692.
127. It would appear that certain statistics validate a fear of such district attorney "inaction."
For example, data released by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania indicates that in 1991, only
eighteen (18) total convictions at the trial court level were obtained by district attorneys prosecuting
under 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903. Figures from Commonwealth of Pennsylvania State
Commission on Crime and Delinquency (Oct. 6, 1993) (on file with the author and the
Commission). Such meager totals suggest a possible lack of interest on the parts of county district
attorneys to pursue such matters vigorously or even to pursue them at all.
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of alternatives available using the obscenity medium which may eliminate
these establishments or the nude dancing occurring therein.
a. Local Obscenity Ordinance.-Local governments may enact their
own obscenity ordinance, either at the county or municipal level. Such
an act is fully contemplated and authorized by the Pennsylvania
Obscenity Statute, which reads: "(k) Ordinances or resolutions.
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to invalidate, supersede, repeal
or preempt any ordinance or resolution of any political subdivision
insofar as it is consistent with this chapter . . . . ,,1 Furthermore,
such enactments have been upheld in Pennsylvania. 29 In enacting such
an ordinance, however, the governmental entities must still provide for
due process safeguards, 3' as well as a proper definition or test for
obscenity in conformity with applicable United States Supreme Court
decisions.' 3 ' As the issue would become one of local concern, the
decision of whether to pursue enforcement of the ordinance would then
lie with the local government entity, not the district attorney.
b. Local Government as Special Prosecutor. -Should municipalities
choose not to adopt their own obscenity ordinance, the possibility of
prosecution under the Pennsylvania Obscenity Statute still remains. This
may be accomplished if the municipalities act as "private prosecutors"
pursuant to state statute. 32  Thus, should district attorneys fail to
128. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903(k).
129. See Brown v. Pornography Commission of Lower Southampton Township, 620 F. Supp.
1199 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (validating township anti-pornography zoning ordinance proscribing same
conduct as State Obscenity Act, even though penalty provisions of township ordinance differ from
those of the State Act; differences in penalty provisions create no material conflict and a township
ordinance penalty is not unreasonably related to township's interest in maintaining public health,
welfare and morals).
130. See Gascoe, Ltd. v. Newton Township, 699 F. Supp. 1092 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (holding that
municipality's use of zoning power to prohibit distribution of adult films was a restraint on the right
to distribute films protected by First Amendment, even though township board's denial of conditional
use permit relied on obscenity ordinance. The ordinance failed to provide for prompt adversarial
hearing for a court to apply the obscenity test and decide whether material was obscene).
131. See Commonwealth v. Landau, 5 Pa. D. & C.4th 15 (1990) (holding local obscenity
ordinance failing to provide a test for obscenity, but vesting unbridled discretion in the district
magistrate, invalid for inconsistency with State Obscenity Statute).
A definition similar to that employed by the State of Pennsylvania in its Obscenity Statute would
be very effective, as said definition quotes, substantially verbatim, the Miller standards for obscenity
most recently set forth by the United States Supreme Court. See Commonwealth v. Stock, 499 A.2d
308 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
132. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1409 (1956) allows for private counsel to prosecute and provides
the following:
If any district attorney shall neglect or refuse to prosecute in due form of law any
criminal charge regularly returned to him or the court of the proper county . . . the
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prosecute municipal complaints of establishments operating in violation
of the Obscenity Statute, municipalities would have recourse in the Court
of Common Pleas.' A judge will impartially review the complaint
for approval or disapproval." Should a judge approve a private
complaint, the individual municipality would then proceed with the
prosecution and would be responsible for the costs of the
prosecution. 35
However, this option is not as viable as it may appear. The court
will accord great deference in reviewing the district attorney's decision
not to prosecute, and will only interfere if there has been a "gross abuse
of discretion. ""3 Additionally, the cost of such a prosecution may be
quite high. Municipal taxpayers are already paying for the services of
the district attorneys, and ultimately any appropriations for private
prosecutions would come out of their pockets. In essence, the taxpayers
would be paying twice for such services. 137
5. Potential Conflicts Involving State Obscenity Statute and Other
Local Ordinances - Double Jeopardy.-Municipalities should be aware
of a potential double jeopardy problem arising from the concurrent
enforcement of the Pennsylvania Obscenity Statute and municipal
ordinances. The doctrine of "double jeopardy" originates from the
United States Constitution, which prohibits any person from being
"subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb, " and was held binding on the states in Benton v.
prosecutor may present his petition to the court of the proper county, setting forth the
character of the complaint, and verify the same by affidavit. If the court shall be of the
opinion that it is a proper case for a criminal proceeding, it may direct any private
counsel employed by such prosecutor to conduct the entire proceeding.
133. See Commonwealth v. Pritchard, 596 A.2d 827, 833 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991);
Commonwealth v. Walter, 367 A.2d 1113, 1116 n.4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976).
134. See Pritchard, 596 A.2d at 833; Walter, 367 A.2d at 1116 n.4.
135. See Title 16, § 1409.
136. Pritchard, 596 A.2d at 833 (citing In re Wood, 482 A.2d 1033, 1036 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1984); Commonwealth v. Eisemann, 419 A.2d 591, 593 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980)).
137. It must also be briefly mentioned that any involvement by the State Attorney General is not
an immediate reality. This government official may not interfere and supplant the local district
attorneys except upon request from those attorneys who lack adequate resources or who represent
an apparent conflict of interest within the office. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 7302-205 (1990)
(setting forth prosecutorial powers of Attorney General). See also Commonwealth v. Khorey, 555
A.2d 100 (Pa. 1989) (citing authorized instances for Attorney General supersession); Commonwealth
v. Carsia, 491 A.2d 237 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (determining Act is sole source of Attorney General's
power). Hence, it appears that absent such a direct request, any appeal to this entity would be ill-
advised and ignored.
138. U.S. CoNST. amend. V.
99 DICKINSON LAW REvIEw FALL 1994
Maryland.3 9 This conflict may arise if a county district attorney
decides to pursue an obscenity prosecution against a nude dancer for a
particular performance, and if a municipality also decides to prosecute
the dancer for an offense under one of its own ordinances (e.g., public
indecency)"4 for the same performance.
In applying this doctrine to the scenario of successive state and
municipal prosecutions, the United States Supreme Court has held that,
since the state and municipality are not considered "separate
sovereignties," such prosecutions for the same criminal conduct
constitutes double jeopardy.' 4' Furthermore, the Court has since
expanded the "same conduct" requirement and the concept of double
jeopardy by holding that "double jeopardy bars a subsequent prosecution
if, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that
prosecution, the government will prove conduct that constitutes an
offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted." 142
Thus, if a nude dancer is charged with a violation of a municipal public
indecency ordinance as a result of a particular performance, double
jeopardy would bar a subsequent state prosecution for violating the
Pennsylvania Obscenity Statute during the same performance.
However, there are ways for municipalities and district attorneys to
avoid this problem. One option would be for both parties to coordinate
their efforts and determine whether the district attorney has enough
evidence to prosecute and is confident of a conviction under the
Obscenity Statute. Based on this assessment, the individual municipality
may then choose to allow the obscenity prosecution to proceed and
ignore the local ordinance violation. In the event the district attorney's
case appears poor or uncertain, the municipality could prosecute the
ordinance violation, with the state disregarding the Obscenity Statute
violation.
A second option is, perhaps, an even more attractive and effective
solution. The dancers (and owners) could be arrested and charged with
separate violations on separate occasions. In this manner, both laws
139. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
In Benton, the Court declared: "Mhe State with all its resources and power should not be
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting
him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing sate of anxiety
and insecurity." Id. at 795-96.
140. For detailed discussion of the public indecency ordinances, see supra notes 76-99 and
accompanying text.
141. Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970). Cf. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313
(1978) (holding successive prosecutions by separate and distinct sovereignties, such as federal and
state, are permissible).
142. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 521 (1990).
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could be concurrently enforced which would operate to eliminate such
behavior and possibly eliminate the establishments. The municipality
avoids double jeopardy and accomplishes its goals at the same time.
6. Recommendation.-Enforcement of the Pennsylvania Obscenity
Statute can be an extremely effective weapon against nude dancing and
the bring your own bottle establishments if the municipality can persuade
its district attorney to pursue such a conviction. Pursuing a private
complaint prosecution is likely to prove futile due to the great latitude
given to the district attorney's decision not to prosecute and the strain
such an action would place on municipal resources. Should a
municipality be fortunate in having a cooperative district attorney,
pursuing enforcement of the statute is highly recommended due to the
statute's application to both dancers and establishment owners, and the
injunctive and criminal penalties provided. Furthermore, this statute may
also be enforced in conjunction with other local ordinances attacking the
same behavior if the proper precautions and procedures are followed.
Localities may also wish to adopt similar obscenity ordinances of their
own in the alternative. Thus, under any of these applications, the
Pennsylvania Obscenity Statute may provide the requisite "knockout
blow" and effectively eliminate nude dancing and the bring your own
bottle establishments from the locale.
IV. Conclusion
Nude dancing in bring your own bottle establishments provides a
host of unique regulatory and secondary problems for Pennsylvania's
municipalities. As this activity gains popularity throughout the state,
more and more localities will be confronted with these problems. Thus,
communities must continue to grapple with these issues in an effort to
strike a delicate balance between the citizens' interests, governmental
interests, and the constitutional rights of the owners and performers.
It appears that whenever municipalities assume this dubious task,
they must take affirmative action and protect themselves through local
ordinances. State laws are ineffective in regulating or eliminating the
nude dancing or the establishments, either through the inapplicability of
the Pennsylvania Liquor Code or the lack of enforcement of the State
Obscenity Statute. Furthermore, future state legislation effectively
licensing these establishments does not appear to be forthcoming.
Instead, simple carefully drawn municipal ordinances, such as public
indecency and zoning, remain the municipalities' most reliable means of
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controlling or eliminating the nude dancing problem in bring your own
bottle establishments.
Ron Kalyan
